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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
WALTER DARWIN BARKER, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
16676 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant is charged with the offense of 
Criminaf Mischief, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(1) (c) (1953), 
as amended, in that he intentionally damaged, defaced or 
destroyed the property of another, causing pecuniary loss 
in excess of $1,000.00 in value. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County rendered a final order granting the defendant's 
Motion to Quash. Said order was entered on August 22, 1979, 
the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State seeks to have the order granting 
the defendant's Motion to Quash set aside, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 8, 1979, Walter Darwin Barker damage~ 
the windshields of sixteen separately owned motor vehicies. 
The vehicles were all parked in the parking lot of P.J. 's 
LOunge in Salt Lake City, and were all damaged during a 
period of sever al minutes. The total value of the damage 
to all sixteen vehicles was approximately $1, BOO. 00. oa::::1 
to any single vehicle did not exceed $250. 00 (R. 8). Becac;, 
appellant acted "intentionally" in damaging property not 1 
belonging to him, and because the aggregate damage resul:::: 
from the same criminal act exceeded the $1, 000 statutory 
minimum, the State charged the defendant (respondent in 
this appeal) with the third degree felony offense of 
Criminal Mischief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 
(1953), as amended. 
The defendant filed a motion to quash the 
motion stating that "the facts alleged constituting a 
third degree felony establish that no third degree felony 
exists, but rather a series of misdemeanors with differen: · 
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victims." (R.18). On August 17, 1979, a hearing on the 
motion was held (R.34). The trial court then took the 
motion under advisement, and subsequently ordered that 
the motion be granted (R.26). 
The State appeals from that order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE SIXTEEN SEPARATELY OWNED 
VEHICLES WERE ALL DAflAGED BY A SINGLE 
CRIMIHAL ACT PROCEEDING FROM THE SAME 
WRONGFUL IHTENT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN QUASHING THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
CHARGE. 
The only issue on appeal is whether respondent's 
criminal act of damaging the windshields of sixteen 
separately ovmed automobiles at the same tine and place 
may be charged as one offense or must be charged as 
sixteen separate offenses against the State. 
Appellant submits that the ruling of the trial 
court v;as in error, and that under the circumstances 
presented in this case the law permits the aggregation 
of all damages to property resulting from one continuous 
act of criminal mischief proceeding from the same criminal 
intent. 
At the outset, appellant notes that this is a 
question of first impression in this State, and consequently 
-3-
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there is no Utah state case or statutory law directly on 
point. 
A 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IS AN OFFENSE 
AGAINST PROPERTY, NOT AGAINST THE 
VARIOUS Ol'i'NERS OF THE DAMAGED 
PROPERTY. 
Under the common law, an element of the malicicj 
mischief offense was malice against the owner of the prope;:I 
Territory v. Olsen, 6 Utah 284, 22 Pac. 163 (1889). Becaus:I 
malice against the owner was an element of the crime, each/ 
piece of property separately owned involved a different I 
criminal intent. Therefore, damage to property of 
different owners constituted a separate offense regardless j 
I 
of how closely related in time and space the offenses may 1, 
have been. , 
I 
However, in adopting the Cr irninal Mischief Sta:a:I 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1953), as amended), the Statd 
Utah departed significantly from the common law. The 
relevant portions of Section 76-6-106 state: 
(1) 
mischief 
(c) 
defaces, 
another. 
A person commits criminal 
if: . 
He intentionally damages, 
or destroys the property of 
(2) (a) 
76-6-106(1) 
degree. 
A violation of section 
(a) is a felony of the third 
-4-
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(b) A violation of section 76-6-106(1) 
(b) is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this 
section is a felony of the third degree 
if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause pecuniary loss in 
excess of $1,000 value; a class A misde-
meanor if the actor's conduct causes or 
is intended to cause pecuniary loss in 
excess of $500; a class B misdemeanor if 
the actor's conduct causes or is intended 
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $250; 
and a class C misdemeanor if the actor's 
conduct causes or is intended to cause 
loss of less than $250. 
The culpable mental state under the statute is 
simply that the actor "intentionally" damages the property 
of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(3) defines "the 
property of another": 
Property is that of another, if 
anyone other than the actor has a 
possessory or proprietary interest in 
any portion thereof. 
Therefore, as long as the accused intentionally damages 
property not belonging to him he is culpable under the 
Criminal Mischief Statute. Any requirement that the action 
stem from malice towards the property owner is noticeably 
absent. 1 The statute focuses on the property and not the 
property owner. Therefore, unlike the common law offense 
1 Colorado has a statute similar to Utah's Criminal Mischief 
Statute. The statute does not require malice against the 
property owner as an element of the crime. In People v. 
Cisneros, 566 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1977), the Supreme Court of 
Colorado held that the element of malice against the 
property owner was intentionally pmitted, and the statute 
should not be interpreted as having malice as an element. 
-5-
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of malicious mischief, a person charged under Utah's 
Criminal Mischief Statute for damaging several pieces of 
property at the same time and place may act with single, 
continuous criminal intent even though the property is 
owned by different owners. Where this is the case, the 
proper charge would be a single charge alleging a single 
offense. Corpus Juris Secondum states: 
Where several violations of a 
statute constitute but one offense, 
as where conunitted at one time, a 
fine for each violation cannot be 
imposed. 
54 C.J.S. Malicious Mischief § 12, p. 947. 
Implicit in this statement is the notion that 
if the damage to several property items resulted from a 
single or continuous criminal act, the damages may be 
aggregated and one offense charged. 
B 
RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE 
A SINGLE OFFENSE BECAUSE THE DAMAGE 
TO EACH CAR WAS PART OF THE SAME 
CRIMINAL ACT PROCEEDING FROM THE 
SAME WRONGFUL INTENT. 
In the area of theft the notion that property 
losses resulting froJT\ a continuous er iminal act may be 
aggregated and one offense charged has long been recognize: 
Because the policy behind both theft and er il'1inal mischie'. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
statutes is the same (i.e., the protection of private 
property) the case law governing theft should be applied 
by analogy to criminal mischief cases. 
Concerning larceny cases where a person in a 
single continuous act or transaction steals property items 
belonging to several different owners, A.L.R.2d states: 
In the vast majority of cases 
wherein the issue of a single or multiple 
larcenies has arisen, or been discussed, 
the courts have held or stated that the 
stealing of property from different 
owners at the same time and at the same 
place constitutes but one larceny. 
28 A.L.R.2d 1182. 
Thus, according to the majority rule, if 
property belonging to several different owners is stolen 
"at the same time and at the sar:ie place" the value of the 
individual property items is aggregated and only one offense 
is charged. The defendant need not be separately charged 
for each piece of stolen property belonging to a separate 
owner. 
The rationale for this rule is that the crime: 
. . is an offense against the 
public, and the prosecution is conducted 
not in the name of the owner of the property, 
nor in his behalf, but in the name of the 
state, the primary object being to protect 
the public against such offenses by the 
punishment of the offender, and, although 
-7-
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it is necessary to set out in the 
indictment the ownership of the 
property, this the law requires in 
order that the prisoner may be 
informed as to the precise nature 
of the offense charged against him, 
and further to enable him to plead 
a former conviction or acquittal, 
in bar of a subsequent prosecution for 
th8 same offense. So, it seems clear 
to us, on principle, that the taking of 
several articles of property under such 
circumstances constitutes but one felony. 
State v. Warren, 7 7 Mo. 121, 2 6 A. 5 0 0 ( 18 9 3) . 
This reasoning has repeatedly been affirmed 
and applied. See 2 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure i 
451; Annotation: 28 A.L.R.2d 1152. In Hearn v. State, SS 
So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951), a case involving the theft of 
livestock belonging to different ovmers, the Supreme Court 
of Florida adopted the majority rule stating: 
Each case of this nature must be 
determined by the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case. There 
is some conflict in the cases, but the 
clear weight of authority is to the 
effect that the stealing of several 
articles at the same time and place 
as one co~tinuous act or transaction 
is a single offense, even though the 
property belongs to different owners, 
for the reason that it is only a single 
act or taking. 
We will align ourselves with 
majority rule in this country. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This rule has also been adopted by the State of Utah. 
State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 Pac. 458 (1901). 
-8-
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Although respondent was charged with Criminal 
Mischief, not theft, Criminal Mischief is not only an 
offense against private property, but is an offense 
against the public, and it is prosecuted by the state 
to protect the public. Individual property owners may 
obtain redress from the offender through civil litigation. 
But the charge of criminal mischief is an action to vindicate 
the public and to punish the offender, not an action for or 
on behalf of the owners of the damaged property. Therefore, 
once it has been established that the damaged property did 
not belong to the defendant the focus is not on the owner-
ship of the property, but on whether the property was damaged 
in a single continuous criminal act proceeding from the same 
criminal intent. 
Corpus Juris Secondurn defines a criminal trans-
action as: "An act or series of acts proceeding from one 
wrongful impulse of the will. 22 C.J.S. § 3, p. 2. 
See 2 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure§ 450, 451, 
and accompanying footnotes 5 and 6. 
Because criminal mischief is a crime against 
proper~y and the public, not the individual property 
Owuers, property damaged in one continuous act proceeding 
from the same wrongful conduct may be charged as one offense 
even though the damaged property has several different 
owners. 
-9-
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This conclusion is consistent with decisions ~ 
embezzlement and theft cases. 
For example in State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330, lo: 
Pac. 34 9 ( 1910), a defendant was convicted of grand larcem· 
for embezzling some $235.60 from the Theater Publishing 
Company over the course of 38 days. The statute in guesLc 
made an offense grand larceny if the amount exceeded $50.0• 
The largest single sum taken by the defendant at one time 
was $48. 60. The defendant requested an instruction that o:.: 
a lesser charge of peti t larceny could be found. This Cou:· 
affirmed the trial court's refusal to give such an instruc:: 
stating: 
We think no error was committed in 
the ruling. The case is not like 
that argued to us by appellant ~~.ere 
the successive larcenies each co~~lete 
and distinct, did not constitute one 
continuous tra~saction; or where 
properties belonging to different 
persons located at different places 
were purloined, and where each 
asportation constituted a separate 
and distinct offense . . But it is 
one of embezzlement 'committed by a 
series of connected transactions 
from day to day' . and shown to 
be a 'continuous offense committed 
by a trusted servant by means of a 
series of connected transactions; 
and in such case a charge of 
embezzlement on a certain date will 
cover and admit evidence of the whole' 
... and is one constituting 'in fact 
and in law a single embezzlement' 
-10-
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and where 'the one substantive charge 
of embezzlement was supported by proof 
of the receipt at different times of 
the amount' the appellant 'was charged 
to have embezzled and one converstion of 
the whole.' 
37 Utah at 332-333 (citation omitted). 
A similar result was reached in State v. McCarthy, 
25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971) where Justice Crockett 
concluded that the theft of nineteen hams (grand larceny) 
was not "a segmented transaction" requiring an instruction on 
petty larceny. See generally 53 ALR3d 398. 
The statute defining the crime of "issuing a bad 
check" supports the contention that the trial court erred 
by quashing the information in this case. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-505 (3) (a) (b) (c) indicates that a series of checks 
drawn within a period of six months may be aggregated to 
determine the degree of offense. 
-11-
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-506.l which proscribes the 
fraudulent use of credit cards has a similar six-month 
aggregation provision. 
The language of the penalty section of the Crimi: 
Mischief Statute also supports the position of the appelk: 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-106 (2) (c) speaks of an actor's conduc: 
causing pecuniary loss and then provides penalties commens;: 
with the amount of loss. 
Appellant submits that the defendant's actions he: 
are "conduct" within the meaning of §76-6-106 (2) (c). 
The necessity of such construction is emphasized; 
a hypothetical. If a person were to break into a china ~~ 
and maliciously destroy hundreds of pieces of china with 
several swings of a crow bar it would seem illogical to 
charge him or her with several hundred misdemeanor counts o' 
criminal mischief for each broken cup, saucer of plate when 
the total value of the destruction was well over the fe~~J 
Forcing the State to charge the defendant here 
with sixteen separate misdemeanors when the property loss 
occurred in the same way, in the same place and at the same 
time cannot be consistent with the legislative intent of the 
criminal mischief statute. 
-12-
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c 
THE APPROPRIATE CHARGE IS A 
SINGLE THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
BASED ON THE AGGREGATE VALUE 
OF THE DAMAGE WHICH IS APPROX-
IMATELY $1800.00. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-106(2) (c) (1953), as amended, 
provides for different classes of offenses depending on the 
amount of pecuniary loss resulting from the property damage~ 
According to the statute, if the actor's conduct 
causes of is intended to cause prcuniary loss in excess of 
$1000.00, then the violation is a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (4) (1) provides that in 
cases like the instant case the "value" of the damages referred 
to above is determined by "the cost of repairing or replacing 
the property within a reasonable time following the offense." 
Because the damage to all 16 vehicles was the result 
of the same criminal act proceeding from the same wrongful 
intent, it constitutes a single criminal offense against 
the state. Consequently, in determining the damages resulting 
from the offense, the damage to each car should be aggregated. 
Based on the cost of repairs, the total value of the damage 
done to all 16 vehicles is $1800.00, well above the $1000.00 
statutory requirement for a felony charge. 
-13-
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CONCLUSION 
The proper charges in this case is a single thira 
degree felony for the offense of Criminal Mischief, t~~ 
is against property, and requires no malice towards the own 
of the property. Because criminal mischief is an offense 
against property and not the property owner, if proper~ 
belonging to several different owners is damaged by one 
continuous wrongful act one offense against the state may 
be charged. For purposes of that one charge the amount of 
monetary damage to the various property i terns may be aggrega 
Appellant prays for reversal of the trial Court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOl"I 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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